President Jimmy Carter’s approach to international affairs could be understood through two types of foreign policy. There is his moralism rooted in his fundamentalist Southern Baptist faith and the realist tradition or realpolitik through which he checked the then-ascending Soviet regional and global power. Neither philosophical orientation was a condition of the other. Carter balanced both, showing the world how he thought about global problems.
When National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski admonished him to be a President Truman before a President Wilson, Carter strove to make the two goals mutually objective.
Credit: Handout
Credit: Handout
Like Truman, Carter applied the doctrine of containment. Carter was not obliged to turn to containment after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. Containment for him was an institution to be extended to a wide and varied sphere. For example, his mediation between Egypt and Israel to establish peace and his annunciation of the Carter Doctrine on Jan. 23, 1980, to defend the Persian Gulf region were in part intended to circumscribe the Soviet influence in these two areas.
His emphasis on human rights brought positive results even to the countries that had committed atrocities or human rights abuses. Soviet scientist and dissident Andrei Sakharov wrote to Carter on Jan. 29, 1977, “It’s very important to defend those who suffer because of their nonviolent struggle, for openness, for justice, for destroyed rights of other people. Our and your duty is to fight for them. I think that a great deal depends on this struggle — trust between the people, trust in high promises and the final result — international security.” Further escalation in the global arms race between Washington and Moscow could have been avoided had the two countries encouraged a trustful relationship and dialogue on human rights.
Overall, the concept of a universal morality was paramount to both President Woodrow Wilson and Carter. The first promulgated self-determination for colonized nations and the second valued the individual freedoms.
The tone of Carter’s synthesis of moralism and realism found its perfect strategic equilibrium in America’s relations with Great Britain. Ian Buruma, in his book “The Churchill Complex,” wrote that many Irish groups wrote to the White House demanding that Carter address the problem of human rights in Northern Ireland. A director for the Irish National Caucus, F.B. O’Brien said, “British patterns of torture do not seem to change much over the centuries, one need only to travel to Charleston, South Carolina and view where the British tortured Americans in their own cellars.” Carter was receptive to this plea, but his temper was one of self-caution in order not to strain American-British relations. Equally important was the agreement with the United Kingdom to modernize its strategic arsenal with U.S.-made Lockheed Trident C4 nuclear missiles.
Carter’s characterization of power and principle was expressed in how he viewed religions as significant centers of power and historical sources of morality.
Carter was extremely courteous with foreign visitors, and he highly esteemed religion in his meetings. On April 20, 1977, he met Pope Shenouda III, the Pope and Patriarch of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt. When they were discussing the travels of Apostle Mark the Evangelist, who founded Christianity in Egypt, he engaged his Egyptian visitor in reading from his private Bible more information about the trips of Saint Mark as they were reported in the Book of Acts. Additionally, Carter met with the highest Islamic Sunni clerk in the world, the Grand Sheik of Al Azhar, Abdel Halim Mahmoud, on Nov. 29, 1977. Carter promised that he would listen to the tapes of the recited Quran, which the Grand Sheik had given Carter as a gift. These noble gestures endeared him to millions and augmented his acquisition of knowledge about power and its instruments and his learning about morality.
The practice of being a moralist and a realist in American foreign policy has slipped from favorability for many U.S. presidents and politicians. Whether these two schools of policy stand alone or separate, they are inextricably and intimately associated with Carter, testifying to his good presidential character.
Many foreign policy practitioners try to be practical and pragmatic. However, they failed. George Bush ignored the Chinese bloodbath in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, and his applications of flashes of realism and power politics in the conclusion of the Gulf War in February 1991 created a nagging strategic quandary that precipitated another costly war. Ironically, he is described as the foreign policy president. Jimmy Carter, however, applied morality to the United States’ long-term strategic interests.
Carter revisionism is justified. Following his example will lend more legitimacy to modern American foreign policy. At the end, the final historical judgment on Carter is high praise.
Nabil S. Mikhail is a former professor in the University of Maryland System and George Washington University.
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