FLOWERY BRANCH — Falcons coach Raheem Morris gave full explanations and rationales for why he didn’t use his timeouts right before the end of the first half and near the end of regulation in the 30-24 overtime loss to the Commanders on Sunday night.
The Falcons could have saved some time and possibly scored a touchdown right before the half. They settled for a 39-yard field goal.
Also, the Falcons had two timeouts remaining on their final drive, but ended up letting 17 seconds run off the clock between plays. If they’d called a timeout, they may have been able to get in better field-goal range for kicker Riley Patterson, who ended up missing a 56-yard attempt.
Morris, on a virtual call with the media Monday. explained that he didn’t want to stop the clock and allow Commanders coach Dan Quinn and defensive coordinator Joe Whitt to send in a designer rush package near the end of the game.
Here’s what Morris said in response to questions from The Atlanta Journal-Constitution about his clock management in the game:
Q: With time to reflect, have you rethought the timeout situations at halftime and the rationale behind not using those timeouts. And then not using them again in the final regulation drive?
A: “Halftime was really easy. Just like I told you last night. You always want to the end half with the ball. We could have burned that one time out. We had that one on the sideline that would have saved us like six seconds and potentially could have (given) us two shots as opposed to one to Drake (London) at the end of the half because you’re going to kick it on fourth down anyway to take the points. ... We probably could have saved six seconds at the end of the half. We wanted to end the half with the ball, so, we were able to do that.
“Talking about the two minutes at the end of the game, a little bit more tricky. You’ve got the ball. You got 40 seconds left. You get the big-time play to (wide receiver Darnell) Mooney. You get the big-time play to Mooney right there, and you really, in our opinion we wanted to jump the ball.
“We wanted to jump the ball with the reason being behind is to keep the regulated rush. If we call time out right there ... we clock it or we do any of those situations right there, stop the clock. That allows them in the fringe (field goal) area to bring out some of the unregulated rushes, their designer blitzes, their (cover) zeros, all those type of things. … We were able to get a four-man rush, regulated rush with guys that we know are coming. Get those guys block up.
“We get a two-and-one on the back end and get us a really good look to Mooney on the sideline that we just missed. It took a little too long. I’d like to have that back obviously because it didn’t work. Possibly, call the timeout and go against a harder-looking defense, take a chance that I’m going to get the harder-looking defense.
“In hindsight, if we can just hit the one route. We get a chance to have the timeouts to utilize the whole field on the next throws. Then we get a chance to get in better position to make it an easier field goal to end it there in regulation. Unfortunately, it didn’t work out that way for me.
“I know (there) always are going to be questions. Fairly so. ... You’ve got to make those decisions in the heat of the moment. With my study, knowing the people and the personnel of Joe Whitt and Dan Quinn on what is going to happen if that clock gets stopped, how it’s going to go down for my young quarterback when it comes to protection purposes. I wanted to get him a regulated four-man rush with my guy (quarterback Michael Penix Jr.) standing the pocket being able to deliver the throw, on being able to get it done.
“This is not throwing my guy under the bus by any means. I will ride with this guy anywhere and all the time. I hate when it comes out that I’m trying to do that. I’m just simply explaining the rationale and the thought process behind it because I really believe in it at the time. When you look back at it, obviously you have to question it, you’ve got to second guess. Being a first-year guy, second game (for Penix), do you want to handle that differently. Maybe ... you’d like to be able to get it done a lot faster. You’d like to be able to get it down and completed. You’d like to see the results if it had happened the way we planned it out.”
Q: If you do call it, you’ve got 17 seconds. You can get a couple of plays off in 17 seconds and maybe have your stuff ready for the designer blitzes?
A: “100 percent. We are talking about zeros (blitzes). When you are talking about zeros, when needed chunk-yardage plays. When you have zero plays, you do have chunk-yardage options. But those chunk-yardage options are not as good as the regulated four-man rush with coverage behind it. With the quarterback stepping into it and having a clean pocket throwing the football down the field.
“Clearly ... those get tougher. Then you’re talking about catch-and-run opportunities. Using those timeouts and doing some of those things, having the ability to do that … but when you need chunk-yardage plays and you got a chance to keep the clock moving and you’re on the offensive, you’re in two-minute and you know you want to keep those things going …. most of the time it’s harder to get those designer pressures when you are coming out of that moving-clock situation that you were able to get them into when you are in those moments. ... I don’t disagree with you. I’m not going to fight this. It’s something that you always consider and think about. You definitely go back and second guess when it doesn’t work, for sure.”
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