Excerpts from the Fani Willis decision

The personal relationship between Fulton County DA Fani Willis, right, and special prosecutor Nathan Wade, left,has come under scrutiny during the Georgia election interference case. (Alyssa Pointer & John Bazemore/AP)

Credit: AP

Credit: AP

The personal relationship between Fulton County DA Fani Willis, right, and special prosecutor Nathan Wade, left,has come under scrutiny during the Georgia election interference case. (Alyssa Pointer & John Bazemore/AP)

The following are excerpts from Fulton County Judge Scott McAfee’s decision on whether Fulton County District Attorney Fani Willis should be recused from her election interference case against former President Donald Trump and 14 remaining co-defendants.

Read the full ruling here or below.

On whether Fani Willis is disqualified from the case:

“After receiving two and a half days of testimony, during which the Defendants were provided an opportunity to subpoena and introduce whatever relevant and material evidence they could muster, the Court finds that the Defendants failed to meet their burden of proving that the District Attorney acquired an actual conflict of interest in this case through her personal relationship and recurring travels with her lead prosecutor. The other alleged grounds for disqualification, including forensic misconduct, are also denied. However, the established record now highlights a significant appearance of impropriety that infects the current structure of the prosecution team - an appearance that must be removed ... The Court therefore concludes that the prosecution of this case cannot proceed until the State selects one of two options. The District Attorney may choose to step aside, along with the whole of her office, and refer the prosecution to the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council for reassignment. See O.C.G.A. § 15-18-5. Alternatively, (Special Assistant District Attorney Nathan) Wade can withdraw, allowing the District Attorney, the Defendants, and the public to move forward without his presence or remuneration distracting from and potentially compromising the merits of this case.”

On testimony that Willis and Wade split costs for travel and entertainment “roughly equally” during their relationship:

“Such a reimbursement practice may be unusual and the lack of any documentary corroboration understandably concerning. Yet the testimony withstood direct contradiction, was corroborated by other evidence ... and was not so incredible as to be inherently unbelievable ... Simply put, the Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence indicating that the expenses were not “roughly divided evenly,” or that the District Attorney was, or currently remains, “greatly and pecuniarily interested” in this prosecution.”

On defendants’ assertions the relationship gave Willis motive to prolong the case:

“Defendants argue that the financial arrangement created an incentive to prolong the case, but in fact, there is no indication the District Attorney is interested in delaying anything. Indeed, the record is quite to the contrary.”

On Willis’ judgment:

“This finding is by no means an indication that the Court condones this tremendous lapse in judgment or the unprofessional manner of the District Attorney’s testimony during the evidentiary hearing.”

On the court’s view that Willis may be questioned in other forums:

“Georgia law does not permit the finding of an actual conflict for simply making bad choices – even repeatedly -and it is the trial court’s duty to confine itself to the relevant issues and applicable law properly brought before it. Other forums or sources of authority such as the General Assembly, the Georgia State Ethics Commission, the State Bar of Georgia, the Fulton County Board of Commissioners, or the voters of Fulton County may offer feedback on any unanswered questions that linger.”

On the appearance of a conflict of interest:

“As the District Attorney testified, her relationship with Wade has only “cemented” after these motions and “is stronger than ever.” Wade’s patently unpersuasive explanation for the inaccurate interrogatories he submitted in his pending divorce indicates a willingness on his part to wrongly conceal his relationship with the District Attorney. As the case moves forward, reasonable members of the public could easily be left to wonder whether the financial exchanges have continued resulting in some form of benefit to the District Attorney, or even whether the romantic relationship has resumed. Put differently, an outsider could reasonably think that the District Attorney is not exercising her independent professional judgment totally free of any compromising influences. As long as Wade remains on the case, this unnecessary perception will persist.”

On whether all testimony in the court was truthful, after noting witness Terrence Bradley was inconsistent and not believable:

“However, an odor of mendacity remains. The Court is not under an obligation to ferret out every instance of potential dishonesty from each witness or defendant ever presented in open court. Such an expectation would mean an end to the efficient disposition of criminal and civil proceedings. Yet reasonable questions about whether the District Attorney and her hand-selected lead (Special Assistant District Attorney) testified untruthfully about the timing of their relationship further underpin the finding of an appearance of impropriety and the need to make proportional efforts to cure it.”

On Willis’ public comments at Bethel AME Church

“[T]he Court cannot find that this speech crossed the line to the point where the Defendants have been denied the opportunity for a fundamentally fair trial, or that it requires the District Attorney’s disqualification. But it was still legally improper. Providing this type of public comment creates dangerous waters for the District Attorney to wade further into. The time may well have arrived for an order preventing the State from mentioning the case in any public forum to prevent prejudicial pretrial publicity, but that is not the motion presently before the Court.”