The federal government, like any large organization, benefits from periodic restructuring. But such adjustments require precision and an understanding of long-term consequences. The Central Intelligence Agency’s “deferred resignation” policy — announced to the workforce on Tuesday by the new director, John Ratcliffe — offers employees a chance to quit while continuing to be paid through September. This policy is a crude, ill-conceived approach masquerading as reform. Far from being the result of agencywide consultation, it reflects a top-down decision focused on reshaping the workforce with little consideration for its potential impact on national security.
Behind this initiative lies the Trump administration’s ongoing effort to shrink the federal workforce — initially launched as a governmentwide effort and now entering a 2.0 phase, one in which national security organizations are not exempt. The inclusion of the intelligence community in this endeavor shows little understanding of — or perhaps no regard for — how intelligence agencies operate or how strategic continuity is maintained.
Credit: Handout
Credit: Handout
The assumption underlying CIA’s deferred resignation policy is that ineffective personnel will self-select for departure. Yet, those who truly do not contribute effectively to mission success are often the most likely to stay, either because they do not perceive their shortcomings or because they lack better options. Meanwhile, high performers — who are keenly aware of their value and have lucrative private-sector opportunities — are more likely to take the offer and leave. This dynamic risks creating the opposite of what the policy intends: a drain on talent and institutional knowledge while supposed under-performers remain entrenched.
Many of those who joined the agency after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks now occupy roles that require a deep understanding of tradecraft, adversary behavior, and institutional knowledge — expertise that cannot be replaced quickly or easily. The agency’s work is not transactional; it relies on years of investment in personnel, training and experience. Those in their second or third decades of service are essential anchors to long-term mission continuity.
And mid-career officers promoted prematurely will face steep learning curves without the necessary mentorship and experience. This is not about preserving the status quo — it’s about ensuring that leadership transitions occur in a way that maintains mission effectiveness. The intelligence community’s success depends on the seamless transfer of knowledge, something that this policy jeopardizes.
The CIA’s decision also to send an unclassified email listing probationary employees — those with less than three years of service — to the White House further highlights the disjointed and ill-considered nature of the Trump policy. If the goal is to purge employees under the probationary period to shield the agency from legal challenges, then compiling a list of names instead of relying on general personnel statistics serves no purpose other than to spread paranoia among the workforce. The naïveté and lack of forethought are further reflected in what is assumed to be Director’s Radcliffe’s belief that providing a list — unclassified, no less — with employee last names limited to initials would somehow mitigate security risks.
This list does not simply endanger individual officers; it jeopardizes critical agency capabilities at a time when adversaries such as China, Russia and Iran actively target U.S. intelligence assets. This misstep reflects a glaring failure in strategic planning to counter emerging counterintelligence threats.
Years of deliberate recruiting efforts are at risk of being undone if the intent is to institute a wholesale purge of the agency’s junior workforce. Under former director William J. Burns, the agency expanded its China-related operations and cybersecurity capabilities. Recruiting Mandarin speakers, technology experts and diverse officers with specialized knowledge has been a cornerstone of countering the complex threat landscape.
Gutting this junior workforce raises two critical questions: Will recruitment be frozen, further compounding the problem? If not, what is gained by replacing probationary but trained officers with untrained new hires?
Halting recruitment won’t be a temporary setback; it will disrupt the agency’s ability to maintain long-term effectiveness. Potential applicants will move on to other opportunities, shrinking the talent pool. Even when a hiring freeze is lifted, new personnel won’t arrive quickly. Each candidate must pass a thorough vetting process, often taking 12 to 18 months. Without a steady recruitment pipeline, the agency’s ability to respond to threats will diminish, giving adversaries more room to exploit vulnerabilities.
Effective reform requires targeted interventions, not blunt instruments. The agency already has mechanisms for identifying and addressing underperformance, including performance reviews and retraining programs. If leadership genuinely seeks to improve effectiveness, it should focus on enhancing these mechanisms rather than creating incentives for the best and brightest to leave.
The CIA’s mission is inherently tied to protecting U.S. interests, and that mission requires depth of thought, strategy, and long-term planning. This policy exhibits none of those qualities. It is reactive, poorly designed, and likely to achieve the opposite of its stated goal.
If this course is not reversed or rethought, the result will be diminished readiness, fractured morale, and an enduring void in critical expertise — precisely the conditions that adversaries such as China, Russia, and Iran will exploit. They will not wait for CIA to rebuild; they will act while its defenses are weakest. And once the damage is done, no quick policy reversal will undo it.
Brian O’Neill, a retired senior executive from the CIA and National Counterterrorism Center, is an instructor on strategic intelligence at Georgia Tech.
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