The U.S. military suffered from widespread problems leading up to the deadly Oct. 4 ambush in Niger, but "no single failure or deficiency was the sole reason" for the deaths of a Green Beret from Georgia and three other U.S. troops during the intense firefight, according to a report the Pentagon released Thursday.
Because of personnel turnover, not all the U.S. troops who were caught in the ambush trained together before they deployed to Niger, the report says. And before they set out with Nigerien troops on their ill-fated mission to capture a militant leader linked to the Islamic State, they did not conduct “pre-mission rehearsals or battle drills” with them.
Further, commanders did not accurately characterize the mission, and the initial plan was not approved by the proper command level, according to the report, which also highlights a “contradictory and ambiguous” process for tracking military operations.
“This investigation identifies individual, organizational, and institutional failures and deficiencies that contributed to the tragic events of 4 October 2017,” says the eight-page report, which is actually a summary of a 6,000-page classified document. “Although the report details the compounding impact of tactical and operational decisions, no single failure or deficiency was the sole reason for the events of 4 October 2017.”
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The summary does not assign direct blame or identify anyone who has been disciplined. Instead, it says “disciplinary action, if warranted, will be addressed” at a later date.
Staff Sgt. Dustin Wright of Lyons was among those who were killed. His father, Ardie, said the troops were not adequately armed or supplied. Senior military leaders, he said, should be disciplined.
“The higher brass is getting a pass,” said Wright, who received an advance briefing about the investigation’s findings last month at Fort Stewart. “They are playing politics.”
Marine Corps Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, the commander of U.S. Africa Command, took responsibility for what happened while briefing reporters at the Pentagon.
“I take ownership for all the events connected to the ambush of 4 October,” he said. “Again, the responsibility is mine.”
Since the ambush, Waldhauser said, the military has carried out a comprehensive review of its procedures and boosted firepower for U.S. troops in Africa.
The military’s findings are based on documents, photographs, video and interviews with 143 witnesses, including survivors of the attack, one of whom accompanied investigators to the scene to explain what happened.
The report paints a harrowing picture of the deadly gunbattle, which started just before noon south of the village of Tongo Tongo. The U.S. and Nigerien troops got out of their vehicles and returned fire before the enemy fighters aligned with the Islamic State began to envelop them. Realizing they were significantly outnumbered by well-trained fighters, the U.S. and Nigerien troops started to withdraw. Staff Sgt. Bryan Black was hit with small arms fire and killed instantly. Despite increasing fire, Wright stopped his vehicle, dismounted and joined Sgt. 1st Class Jeremiah Johnson in attempting to give Black cover and assess his wounds. Then Johnson was shot and severely wounded. Wright went to Johnson’s side and continued to fight until both were shot and killed by small arms fire.
Meanwhile, Sgt. LaDavid Johnson and two Nigerien soldiers came under heavy enemy fire, preventing them from returning to their vehicle. They ran as enemy fighters rapidly closed in on them. Both Nigerien troops were shot and killed. Johnson sought cover under a thorny tree and returned fire. The enemy fired back with a vehicle-mounted machine gun. Ultimately, Johnson was killed by small arms fire.
Nigerien and French forces responded immediately after they were called in for help, according to the report. Departing 8 minutes after they were alerted, Nigerien ground forces arrived in Tongo Tongo about four hours and 25 minutes later. The distance to the battleground, a lack of roads and rough terrain were all factors in the time of response. French Mirage jets arrived about 47 minutes after they were contacted for help. They were armed but did not fire because they did not know precisely where the U.S. troops were and had no communications with them. Instead, they flew at a low altitude, causing the enemy to retreat for cover. Five hours after the ambush began, two French helicopters arrived and evacuated the surviving soldiers.
The report also says U.S. troops never crossed into Mali to pursue terrorists as some news media have reported and that the troops were never captured alive. Also, according to the report, all four U.S. soldiers died from their wounds immediately or rapidly before the French and Nigerien rescuers arrived in Tongo Tongo. In all, four Nigerien troops were killed during the gunbattle.
Additionally, Wright and the other U.S. troops fought courageously, the report says. They are now being considered for commendations.
“There will be awards for valor in this case,” Waldhauser said.
Ardie Wright was gratified to learn about his son’s heroism.
“I’d rather have my son back,” he said in a voice edged with emotion, “than a dead hero.”
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